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The veil of public ignorance

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  • Nehring, Klaus

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  • Nehring, Klaus, 2004. "The veil of public ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 247-270, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:119:y:2004:i:2:p:247-270
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    5. Mongin Philippe, 1995. "Consistent Bayesian Aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 313-351, August.
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    9. Myerson, Roger B, 1984. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 461-487, March.
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    11. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    12. Amrita Dhillon & Jean-Francois Mertens, 1999. "Relative Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 471-498, May.
    13. Klaus Nehring, 2001. "Common priors under incomplete information: a unification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(3), pages 535-553.
    14. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1985. "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 608, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    16. F J Anscombe & R J Aumann, 2000. "A Definition of Subjective Probability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7591, David K. Levine.
    17. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
    18. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
    19. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
    20. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1979. "The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1321-1336, November.
    21. Hammond, Peter J, 1981. "Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 48(191), pages 235-250, August.
    22. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July.
    23. Faruk Gul, 1998. "A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 923-928, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Grüner, Hans Peter & Engelmann, Dirk & Possajennikov, Alex & Hoffmann, Timo, 2020. "Minority Protection in Voting Mechanisms - Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 14393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Debasis Mishra & Xu Lang, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Discussion Papers 22-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    3. Dietrich, Franz, 2021. "Fully Bayesian aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    4. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2012. "Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 413-423.
    5. Hellman, Ziv, 2011. "Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 163-171, May.
    6. Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
    7. Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato, 2020. "Social preference under twofold uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 633-663, October.
    8. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    9. Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1067-1088, November.
    10. Lang, Xu & Mishra, Debasis, 0. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    11. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on "The Veil of Public Ignorance"," Working Papers 2010-3, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    12. Lin, Zhongjian & Tang, Xun & Yu, Ning Neil, 2021. "Uncovering heterogeneous social effects in binary choices," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(2), pages 959-973.
    13. Takashi Hayashi, 2019. "What Should Society Maximise Under Uncertainty?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 446-478, December.
    14. Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1067-1088, November.
    15. Franz Dietrich, 2020. "The Rational Group," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02431868, HAL.
    16. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    17. Xu Lang & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Papers 2207.09253, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

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