Common priors under incomplete information: a unification
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References listed on IDEAS
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Kahn, Charles M., 1991.
"Protecting the winner : Second-price versus oral auctions,"
Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 243-248, March.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. & Kahn, C.M., 1990. "Protecting the Wnner: Second-price Versus Oral Auctions," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-8, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
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- Nehring, Klaus, 2004. "The veil of public ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 247-270, December.
- Adam Dominiak & Jean-Philippe Lefort, 2013. "Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 1-13, January.
- Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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KeywordsCommon prior assumption; Harsanyi doctrine; Incomplete information; Imperfect memory.;
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