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Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties

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  • John Tyson Chatagnier

Abstract

Within the international system, states frequently fight even when opponents have little or nothing to offer them. Yet, international relations scholars envision conflict as a means for states to acquire some amount of a desired good, and view bargaining through this lens. This paper presents a model in which war and conflict bargaining can serve as signals to potentially hostile third parties. The analysis indicates that states sometimes have incentives to bargain harder than they would otherwise, in order to conceal information from future enemies. This can lead to war, even when a peaceful settlement should be possible.

Suggested Citation

  • John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:27:y:2015:i:2:p:237-268
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629813518829
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    References listed on IDEAS

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