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Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries

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  • Patrick Hummel

Abstract

I present a model in which a nation must decide whether to reveal its military capacity when the nation faces two possible adversaries. One adversary would be inclined to attack if the country has a weak military capacity, and the other adversary would be inclined to attack preemptively if the country is developing a strong military capacity. I derive conditions under which it is an equilibrium for the nation to be ambiguous about its military capacity as a function of the hawkishness of the adversaries and the accuracy of the adversaries’ national intelligence.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Hummel, 2015. "Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 288-300, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:27:y:2015:i:2:p:288-300
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629814531517
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    References listed on IDEAS

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