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War Is in the Error Term

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  • Gartzke, Erik

Abstract

At least since Thucydides, students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war. Rationalist explanations assume purposive action; states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force. Although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive, durable, and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing, they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war. I show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate. We cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war, because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante, both to us as researchers and to the participants. Thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically. However, the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element. Accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables—however detailed the explanation—serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives. We can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace, but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic. For example, we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises, but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance. The need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight. Otherwise, states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty. It has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty, but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic. War is literally in the “error term.â€

Suggested Citation

  • Gartzke, Erik, 1999. "War Is in the Error Term," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 567-587, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:53:y:1999:i:03:p:567-587_44
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    Cited by:

    1. Håvard Hegre, 2005. "Development and the Liberal Peace," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 17-46.
    2. David J. Brulé & Bryan W. Marshall & Brandon C. Prins, 2010. "Opportunities and Presidential Uses of Force," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(5), pages 486-510, November.
    3. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Samuel Bazzi & Robert A. Blair & Christopher Blattman & Oeindrila Dube & Matthew Gudgeon & Richard Peck, 2022. "The Promise and Pitfalls of Conflict Prediction: Evidence from Colombia and Indonesia," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 764-779, October.
    5. David H. Bearce & Eric O'N. Fisher, 2002. "Economic Geography, Trade, and War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(3), pages 365-393, June.
    6. Erik Gartzke & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "To conquer or compel: war, peace, and economic development," IEW - Working Papers 511, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2013. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust, and Conflict," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 1114-1147.
    8. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 2005. "War, peace, and the size of countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1333-1354, July.
    9. Patrick E. Shea & Paul Poast, 2018. "War and Default," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(9), pages 1876-1904, October.
    10. Ryan D. Edwards, 2010. "A Review of War Costs in Iraq and Afghanistan," NBER Working Papers 16163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Eelco van der Maat, 2021. "Simplified complexity: Analytical strategies for conflict event research," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(1), pages 87-108, January.
    12. Ghulam Shabbir & Amjad Naveed & Muhammad Ali Khan & Shabib Haider Syed, 2022. "Does Peace Promote Bilateral Trade Flows? An Economic Analysis of Panel Data in Asian Perspective," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 64(1), pages 143-158, March.
    13. Robert Schub, 2017. "Unfair fights: Power asymmetry, nascent nuclear capability, and preventive conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 431-455, July.
    14. Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Natural resource distribution and multiple forms of civil war," IEW - Working Papers 498, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Clayton L. Thyne, 2006. "Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(6), pages 937-961, December.
    16. Giacomo Chiozza & H. E. Goemans, 2003. "Peace through Insecurity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(4), pages 443-467, August.
    17. Muhammet A. Bas & Robert J. Schub, 2016. "How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(6), pages 1099-1128, September.
    18. Michaela Mattes & Burcu Savun, 2010. "Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 511-524, April.
    19. Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake, 2005. "International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 600(1), pages 136-156, July.
    20. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    21. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2007. "Political Bias and War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1353-1373, September.
      • Jackson, Matthew O. & Morelli, Massimo, "undated". "Political bias and war," Working Papers 1247, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    22. Donald Wittman, 2009. "Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 588-602, July.
    23. D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam, 2000. "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(5), pages 653-685, October.
    24. Ebaidalla Mahjoub Ebaidalla, 2016. "Trade between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia: Prospects and Challenges for Trilateral Trade Integration," Working Papers 1057, Economic Research Forum, revised 10 2016.

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