An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Neelin, Janet & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Spiegel, Matthew, 1988. "A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 824-836, September.
- Binmore, Ken G & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1988. "A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 837-839, September.
- Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August.
- Binmore, Ken & McCarthy, John & Ponti, Giovanni & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 2002. "A Backward Induction Experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 48-88, May.
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2000.
"Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1079-1089, May.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, "undated". "Asymmetric Inequality Aversion and Noisy Behavior in Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games," Virginia Economics Online Papers 329, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Cohen, Michele & Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Said, Tanios, 1987. "Experimental comparison of individual behavior under risk and under uncertainty for gains and for losses," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-22, February.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:107:y:2013:i:04:p:849-865_00 is not listed on IDEAS
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2017.
"Balance of power and the propensity of conflict,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 168-184.
- Luisa Herbst & Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2014. "Balance of power and the propensity of conflict," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-13_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Morath, Florian & Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A., 2015. "Balance of power and the propensity of conflict," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112837, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
More about this item
Keywordsbargaining; conflict; quantal response equilibrium; laboratory experiments;
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:4:y:2013:i:3:p:375-397:d:27697. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (XML Conversion Team). General contact details of provider: http://www.mdpi.com/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.