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Negotiating the Terms of Settlement

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  • Suzanne Werner

    (Department of Political Science, Emory University)

Abstract

How do we explain the wide variation in the terms of settlement that end wars? One possibility is that the terms of settlement merely reflect the belligerents' original aims. A second possibility is that the final terms arise out of negotiations to terminate the war and reflect each side's evaluation of the costs and political risks of continuing the war. The author tests hypotheses derived from both perspectives using ordered logit regression in the period 1816-1980. The results generally support both the aims and the bargaining hypotheses. In contrast, the author finds that the belligerents' regime type does not affect the final terms. The author concludes that belligerents generally use the bargaining leverage they have to demand as much as possible and to concede as little as possible, but their original aims can affect their bargaining leverage by increasing the political risks of continuing the war past a certain point.

Suggested Citation

  • Suzanne Werner, 1998. "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 321-343, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:3:p:321-343
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042003006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 520-534, August.
    2. Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner, 2007. "The Dynamics of Bargaining and War," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 31-50, January.

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