Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals.
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