The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits
Why do some academics continue to be productive after receiving tenure? This paper answers this question by using a Stackelberg differential game between departments and scholars. We show that departments can set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic habits. As a result, academic habits have a lasting positive impact in scholar’s productivity, leading to higher scholar’s productivity rate of growth and higher productivity level.
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