On Choosing Which Game to Play When Ignorant of the Rules
No abstract is available for this item.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Agastya, M., 1993.
"Multi-Player Bargaining Situations: A Decision Theoretic Approach,"
UWO Department of Economics Working Papers
9307, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Agastya, Murali, 1996. "Multiplayer Bargaining Situations: A Decision Theoretic Approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, January.
- Roth, Alvin, 2012.
"The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility,"
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-9.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1977. "The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 657-664, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000557. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.