The fee structure in franchising: a property rights view
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References listed on IDEAS
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- López-Fernández, Begoña & López-Bayón, Susana, 2011. "Economic rents in franchising: Do they exist?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 195-198.
- repec:kap:sbusec:v:50:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11187-017-9885-3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Josef Windsperger, 2013. "The governance of franchising networks," Chapters,in: Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 27 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- repec:gam:jsusta:v:9:y:2017:i:8:p:1419-:d:107916 is not listed on IDEAS
- Котляров И.Д., 2015. "Отбор Партнера По Лицензионному Соглашению," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 51(2), pages 103-112, апрель.
- Josef Windsperger, 2003. "Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(3), pages 291-313, September.
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