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Choice of financing mode as a stochastic bounded control problem

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  • Miglo, Anton

Abstract

In this note I analyze situations where an entrepreneur needs external financing from an outside investor in order to start an investment project that will yield a profit for two consecutive periods. The value of second-period profit is the entrepreneur's private information. I show that the choice of financing mode can be transformed into an optimal stochastic bounded control problem, where the state variable t represents the investor's first-period payoff and the control variable α can be interpreted in terms of the investor's residual profit rights. I then show that under certain general conditions such as the monotonicity and continuity of t (which have clear economic interpretations), an optimal contract is characterized by maximal α under low values of t and minimal α under high values of t. In economic terms this corresponds to debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Miglo, Anton, 2014. "Choice of financing mode as a stochastic bounded control problem," MPRA Paper 56323, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56323
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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