IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/sbusec/v53y2019i1d10.1007_s11187-018-0037-1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Market imperfections and crowdfunding

Author

Listed:
  • Anton Miglo

    (Birmingham City University)

  • Victor Miglo

    (University of Toronto)

Abstract

This article is the first one that considers the choice between the different types of crowdfunding and traditional financing under different types of market imperfections. In contrast to most existing literature, we focus on financial aspects of crowdfunding rather than on price discrimination between customers using a new approach on the demand side. The model provides several implications, most of which have not yet been tested. For example, we find that when asymmetric information is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. A low-quality firm may find it unprofitable to mimick this strategy as it will be taking more risk to achieve a threshold. This result is contradictory to the spirit of the results in Belleflamme et al. (Journal of Business Venturing: Entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurial Finance, Innovation and Regional Development, 29(5), 585–609, 2014), which finds that asymmetric information favours equity-based crowdfunding. In contrast to Belleflamme et al. (Journal of Business Venturing: Entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurial Finance, Innovation and Regional Development, 29(5), 585–609, 2014), in our model, crowdfunding does not have any ad-hoc non-monetary benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Anton Miglo & Victor Miglo, 2019. "Market imperfections and crowdfunding," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 51-79, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:53:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11187-018-0037-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-018-0037-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11187-018-0037-1
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11187-018-0037-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demichelis, S. & Tarola, O., 2006. "Capacity expansion and dynamic monopoly pricing," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 169-178, December.
    2. Ajay Agrawal & Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, 2014. "Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-97.
    3. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    4. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:1:p:1-19 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Rajagopal, 2014. "The Human Factors," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Architecting Enterprise, chapter 9, pages 225-249, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. "The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
    8. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    9. Winborg, Joakim & Landstrom, Hans, 2001. "Financial bootstrapping in small businesses: Examining small business managers' resource acquisition behaviors," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 235-254, May.
    10. Choe, Hyuk & Masulis, Ronald W. & Nanda, Vikram, 1993. "Common stock offerings across the business cycle : Theory and evidence," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-31, June.
    11. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    12. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    13. Gerrit K.C. Ahlers & Douglas Cumming & Christina Günther & Denis Schweizer, 2015. "Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(4), pages 955-980, July.
    14. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    15. Nachman, David C & Noe, Thomas H, 1994. "Optimal Design of Securities under Asymmetric Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 1-44.
    16. Anton Miglo, 2020. "Financing of Entrepreneurial Firms in Canada: Some Patterns," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-27, August.
    17. Anton Miglo, 2016. "Capital Structure in the Modern World," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-319-30713-8, January.
    18. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R., 2001. "The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 187-243, May.
    19. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    20. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    21. Mollick, Ethan, 2014. "The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Crowdfunding and bank financing: substitutes or complements?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 1115-1142, October.
    2. Marco Bade & Martin Walther, 2021. "Local preferences and the allocation of attention in equity-based crowdfunding," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(8), pages 2501-2533, November.
    3. Yasir Shahab & Yasir Riaz & Collins G. Ntim & Zhiwei Ye & Qingjing Zhang & Ran Feng, 2021. "Online feedback and crowdfunding finance in China," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 4634-4652, July.
    4. Miglo, Anton, 2022. "The role of location in the emergence of crowdfunding," MPRA Paper 115833, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Anton Miglo, 2020. "Crowdfunding in a Competitive Environment," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-38, February.
    6. Michael J. Ryoba & Shaojian Qu & Ying Ji & Deqiang Qu, 2020. "The Right Time for Crowd Communication during Campaigns for Sustainable Success of Crowdfunding: Evidence from Kickstarter Platform," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(18), pages 1-22, September.
    7. Miglo, Anton, 2018. "Crowdfunding in a duopoly under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 89016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Anton Miglo, 2021. "STO vs. ICO: A Theory of Token Issues under Moral Hazard and Demand Uncertainty," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-35, May.
    9. Irene Comeig & Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez & Pau Sendra-Pons & Amparo Urbano, 2020. "Rational Herding in Reward-Based Crowdfunding: An MTurk Experiment," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(23), pages 1-21, November.
    10. Anton Miglo, 2020. "Financing of Entrepreneurial Firms in Canada: Some Patterns," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-27, August.
    11. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Theories of Crowdfunding and Token Issues: A Review," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-28, May.
    12. Swati Oberoi & Smita Srivastava & Vishal K. Gupta & Rohit Joshi & Atul Mehta, 2022. "Crowd Reactions to Entrepreneurial Failure in Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Psychological Contract Theory Perspective," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-26, July.
    13. Eric Tassel, 2023. "Crowdfunding investors, intermediaries and risky entrepreneurs," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 1033-1050, March.
    14. Simon Kleinert & Christine Volkmann & Marc Grünhagen, 2020. "Third-party signals in equity crowdfunding: the role of prior financing," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 341-365, January.
    15. Tuo Gladys & Yi Feng & Sarpong Solomon & Wang Wenxin, 2020. "The Second Round Resource Acquisition of Entrepreneurial Crowdfunded Ventures: The Relevance of Campaign and Project Implementation Performance Outcomes," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-21, July.
    16. Miglo Anton, 2021. "Crowdfunding Under Market Feedback, Asymmetric Information And Overconfident Entrepreneur," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-19, October.
    17. Lei Wang & Weijia You & Yingying Zhou & Fei Meng, 2022. "How Does Green Supply Chain Management Promote the Success of Crowdfunding Projects? Empirical Research Based on the QCA Method," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-21, September.
    18. Mari-Liis Kukk & Laivi Laidroo, 2020. "Institutional Drivers of Crowdfunding Volumes," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-28, December.
    19. Hui He & Yan Bai & Xia Xiao, 2020. "How Past Failure Predicts Subsequent Entrepreneurial Intention: A Comparative Study of Mainland China and Taiwan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(6), pages 1-17, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Miglo Anton, 2021. "Crowdfunding Under Market Feedback, Asymmetric Information And Overconfident Entrepreneur," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-19, October.
    2. Anton Miglo, 2020. "Zero-Debt Policy under Asymmetric Information, Flexibility and Free Cash Flow Considerations," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-25, November.
    3. Miglo, Anton, 2022. "Theories of financing for entrepreneurial firms: a review," MPRA Paper 115835, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Miglo, Anton, 2020. "ICO vs. Equity Financing Under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 99598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. İbrahim Yarba & Z. Nuray Güner, 2020. "Leverage dynamics: Do financial development and government leverage matter? Evidence from a major developing economy," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(5), pages 2473-2507, November.
    6. Anton Miglo, 2023. "ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information," FinTech, MDPI, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.
    7. Saul Estrin & Susanna Khavul & Mike Wright, 2022. "Soft and hard information in equity crowdfunding: network effects in the digitalization of entrepreneurial finance," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1761-1781, April.
    8. Anton Miglo, 2012. "Managers versus Students: New Approach in Improving Capital Structure Education," Journal of Education and Vocational Research, AMH International, vol. 3(11), pages 353-369.
    9. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Theories of Crowdfunding and Token Issues: A Review," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-28, May.
    10. Miglo, Anton, 2021. "A New Capital Structure Theory: The Four-Factor Model," MPRA Paper 105102, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Daniel Blaseg & Douglas Cumming & Michael Koetter, 2021. "Equity Crowdfunding: High-Quality or Low-Quality Entrepreneurs?," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 45(3), pages 505-530, May.
    12. Drobetz, Wolfgang & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Merikas, Andreas & Schröder, Henning, 2013. "Capital structure decisions of globally-listed shipping companies," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 49-76.
    13. Blaseg, Daniel & Koetter, Michael, 2015. "Friend or Foe? Crowdfunding Versus Credit when Banks are Stressed," IWH Discussion Papers 8/2015, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    14. Jacek Jaworski & Leszek Czerwonka, 2021. "Determinants of Enterprises’ Capital Structure in Energy Industry: Evidence from European Union," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-21, March.
    15. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti, 2005. "Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 615-649.
    16. Babl, Christian & Fausel, Andreas & Kuhlman, Leonard & Schiereck, Dirk, 2014. "Werteffekte auf Anleiheemissionen: Eine Note für deutsche Emittenten," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(1), pages 8-22.
    17. Mark Gertler, 1988. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
    18. Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
    19. Alex Edmans & William Mann, 2019. "Financing Through Asset Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 3043-3060, July.
    20. Ulf Axelson & Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, 2009. "Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1549-1582, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crowdfunding; Asymmetric information; Moral hazard; Equity-based crowdfunding; Reward-based crowdfunding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:53:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11187-018-0037-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.