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Crowdfunding Under Market Feedback, Asymmetric Information And Overconfident Entrepreneur

Author

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  • Miglo Anton

    (Birmingham City Business School, Birmingham City University, BirminghamB5 5JU, United Kingdom)

Abstract

This article is the first one that considers a model of the choice between the different types of crowdfunding, which contains elements of the asymmetric information approach and behavioral finance (overconfident entrepreneurs). The model provides several implications, most of which have not yet been tested. Our model predicts that equity-based crowdfunding is more profitable than reward-based crowdfunding when an entrepreneur is overconfident. This is because the entrepreneur learns from the sale of shares before making production decisions. The model also predicts that an equilibrium can exist where some firms use equity-based crowdfunding, which contrasts the results of traditional theories (which have rational managers), for example, the pecking-order theory. It also contrasts traditional behavioral finance literature (e. g. Fairchild, R. 2005. “The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence, Asymmetric Information, and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.” ICFAI Journal of Behavioral Finance 2 (4).) where equity is not issued in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Miglo Anton, 2021. "Crowdfunding Under Market Feedback, Asymmetric Information And Overconfident Entrepreneur," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-19, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:erjour:v:11:y:2021:i:4:p:19:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/erj-2019-0018
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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Guillaume Sekli, 2022. "Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding," Working Papers hal-04222321, HAL.
    2. Anton Miglo, 2023. "ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information," FinTech, MDPI, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.
    3. Anton Miglo, 2020. "Crowdfunding in a Competitive Environment," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-38, February.
    4. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Guillaume Sekli, 2025. "Early contributors and fair rewards in crowdfunding," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 33-59, February.
    5. Miglo, Anton, 2018. "Crowdfunding in a duopoly under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 89016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Sandra Correia & Miguel Sousa & Elísio Brandão, 2024. "What do we know about the choices of entrepreneurs before the equity crowdfunding campaign?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 1471-1501, December.
    7. Anton Miglo, 2021. "STO vs. ICO: A Theory of Token Issues under Moral Hazard and Demand Uncertainty," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-35, May.
    8. Davies, William Edmund & Giovannetti, Emanuele, 2022. "Latent network capital and gender in crowdfunding: Evidence from the Kiva platform," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    9. Marco Bade & Martin Walther, 2021. "Local preferences and the allocation of attention in equity-based crowdfunding," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(8), pages 2501-2533, November.
    10. Alex Barrachina & Eduardo Jiménez-Fernández, 2025. "The step-level public good aspect of equity crowdfunding: A game-theoretic analysis," Rationality and Society, , vol. 37(3), pages 300-337, August.
    11. Swati Oberoi & Smita Srivastava & Vishal K. Gupta & Rohit Joshi & Atul Mehta, 2022. "Crowd Reactions to Entrepreneurial Failure in Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Psychological Contract Theory Perspective," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-26, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

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