Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity
No abstract is available for this item.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ching-to Albert Ma, 1990.
"Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts,"
0004, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Leslie M. Marx, 1998. "Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(4), pages 371-387.
- Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L., 1990.
"Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt1678w3w9, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1735-53, November.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 1990. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Economics Working Papers 90-141, University of California at Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts,"
494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
- Steven A. Matthews, 1993.
"Renegotiation of Sales Contracts,"
1051, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
- Ching-to Albert Ma, 1991. "Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 255-275.
- Dionne, Georges & Viala, Pascale, 1994. "Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 113-119, October.
- Thomas Hellmann, 1998. "The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 57-76, Spring.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:a1fc611f7c8c403f24c4d20a64340752. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.