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Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information

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  • Azar, Pablo D.
  • Kleinberg, Robert
  • Weinberg, S. Matthew

Abstract

Prophet inequalities have recently become a fundamental tool in the design of sequential and multi-dimensional mechanisms in Bayesian settings. However, existing mechanisms—as well as the underlying prophet inequalities behind their analysis—require sophisticated information about the distribution from which inputs are drawn.

Suggested Citation

  • Azar, Pablo D. & Kleinberg, Robert & Weinberg, S. Matthew, 2019. "Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 511-532.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:511-532
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game Theory; Bargaining Theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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