Break-offs in Bargaining, Evidence from a Video Experiment
In this paper we report on a new methodology of observing subjects behavior in a laboratory situation: Videotaping groups of subjects who have to perform a common task provides information on decision processes that cannot be obtained by another method. We conducted a videotaped bargaining experiment in order to gain information on the emergence of break offs in negotiations. Field studies as well as experiments show that break offs are a nonnegligible phenomenon in bargaining. There is an extended literature on the question whether these findings can be explained within the game theoretic framework assuming individual rational players being guided only by economic or whether one has to assume also noneconomic motivating factors. Analyzing the transcripts reveals that potential break offs are discussed in all sessions and not only in those ending by a breakdown. Moreover, subjects are guided by economic and noneconomic motivations. In addition to the monetary aspect, concepts are to be considered which have been developed in psychology, i.e. negative reciprocity, and power. Based on these findings we present a motivational explanation of potential and actual break offs showing that emotions, especially anger, cause subjects to re-evaluate the outcome of the game. Excerpts of group discussions (translated into English) in a session ending by break off are to be found in the Appendix.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1997|
|Date of revision:||May 1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany|
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.