A Deliberative Independent Central Bank
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsaccountability; agency losses; principal agent model;
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2006-12-01 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2006-12-01 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2006-12-01 (Monetary Economics)
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