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Fairness in Auctions and Task Assignments

Author

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  • Duygu Yengin

    () (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an efficient way and induce the agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, fist we characterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-deficit condition and characterize the corresponding class. Finally, we investigate the relations between egalitarian- equivalence and other fairness notions such as no-envy.

Suggested Citation

  • Duygu Yengin, 2009. "Fairness in Auctions and Task Assignments," School of Economics Working Papers 2009-27, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2009-27
    as

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    File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2009-27.pdf
    File Function: 2009
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Murat Atlamaz & Duygu Yengin, 2008. "Fair Groves mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 573-587, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    allocation of indivisible goods and money; fair auctions; task assignments; strategy-proofness; the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms; order preservation; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; egalitarianism;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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