On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games
We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy ESS for asymmetric two-population games of finite size in its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a defnition of ESS for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. Then, we show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (NE) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) NE of the symmetric version game. So, we study (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and define corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game.
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