On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games
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- Tiziano Distefano & Simone D'Alessandro, 2018. "An Evolutionary Approach to International Environmental Agreements," SEEDS Working Papers 0418, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Mar 2018.
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KeywordsAsymmetric game; Evolutionary games; ESS; Replicator dynamics.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-EVO-2011-02-19 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-19 (Game Theory)
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