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Determinants of relative bargaining power in monetary unions

  • Brigitte Granville
  • Dominik Nagly

This paper studies the bargaining power of the debtors versus the creditors in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

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File URL: http://webspace.qmul.ac.uk/pmartins/CGRWP47.pdf
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Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research in its series Working Papers with number 47.

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Date of creation: Dec 2013
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Handle: RePEc:cgs:wpaper:47
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  1. Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús & Garicano, Luis & Santos, Tano, 2013. "Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone," CEPR Discussion Papers 9404, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Time inconsistency and free-riding in a monetary union," Staff Report 308, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. J. McCarthy, 1999. "Pass-through of exchange rates and import prices to domestic inflation in some industrialised economies," BIS Working Papers 79, Bank for International Settlements.
  4. Engel, C., 1996. "Accounting for U.S. Real Exchange Rate Changes," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 96-02, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  5. Buiter, Willem H. & Rahbari, Ebrahim, 2013. "Why do governments default, and why don't they default more often?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9492, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Stefan Kawalec & Ernest Pytlarczyk, 2012. "Controlled Dismantlement of the Euro Area in Order to Preserve the European Union and Single European Market," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 441, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  7. Eric M. Leeper, 2013. "Fiscal Limits and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 18877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
  9. Mark Weisbrot & Rebecca Ray, 2011. "Latvia's Internal Devaluation: A Success Story?," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2011-25, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
  10. Stefan Kawalec & Ernest Pytlarczyk, 2013. "Controlled Dismantlement of the Eurozone: A Strategy to Save the European Union and the Single European Market," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(1), pages 31-49, 02.
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