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Determinants of relative bargaining power in monetary unions

Author

Listed:
  • Brigitte Granville
  • Dominik Nagly

Abstract

This paper studies the bargaining power of the debtors versus the creditors in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Suggested Citation

  • Brigitte Granville & Dominik Nagly, 2013. "Determinants of relative bargaining power in monetary unions," Working Papers 47, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgs:wpaper:47
    as

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    File URL: http://webspace.qmul.ac.uk/pmartins/CGRWP47.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2013. "Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Eurozone," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 145-166, Summer.
    2. Stefan Kawalec & Ernest Pytlarczyk, 2013. "Controlled Dismantlement of the Eurozone: A Strategy to Save the European Union and the Single European Market," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(1), pages 31-49, February.
    3. Varadarajan V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(7), pages 1329-1356, October.
    4. Charles Engel, 1999. "Accounting for U.S. Real Exchange Rate Changes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 507-538, June.
    5. Eric M. Leeper, 2013. "Fiscal Limits and Monetary Policy," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 13(2), pages 33-58.
    6. Jonathan McCarthy, 2007. "Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Import Prices to Domestic Inflation in Some Industrialized Economies," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 511-537, Fall.
    7. Stefan Kawalec & Ernest Pytlarczyk, 2012. "Controlled Dismantlement of the Euro Area in Order to Preserve the European Union and Single European Market," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 441, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    8. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 371-396.
    9. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
    10. Buiter, Willem H. & Rahbari, Ebrahim, 2013. "Why do governments default, and why don't they default more often?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9492, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Mark Weisbrot & Rebecca Ray, 2011. "Latvia's Internal Devaluation: A Success Story?," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2011-25, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. QED n. 27: What? France? Yes. France.
      by Alberto Bagnai in Goofynomics on 2014-01-08 04:18:00

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining power; competitiveness; disagreement cost; European Monetary Union; internal devaluation; transfer union;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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