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Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition

Author

Listed:
  • Xin Zhao

    (Economics Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney)

Abstract

This paper studies how the composition and voting rule of a decision-making committee affect the incentives for its members to acquire information. Fixing the voting rule, a more polarized committee acquires more information. If a committee designer can choose the committee members and voting rule to maximize her payoff from the collective decision, she forms a heterogeneous committee adopting a unanimous rule, in which one member moderately biased toward one decision serves as the decisive voter, and all others are extremely opposed to the decisive voter and serve as information providers. The preference of the decisive voter is not perfectly aligned with that of the designer.

Suggested Citation

  • Xin Zhao, 2018. "Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition," Working Paper Series 52, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  • Handle: RePEc:uts:ecowps:52
    as

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    File URL: https://www.uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/2019-01/Heterogeneity%20and%20Unanimity_Xin%20Zhao_GEB_0.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committee design; information acquisition; heterogeneity; voting;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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