Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, 2002.
"Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 617-635, October.
- Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, "undated". "Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Abrego, Lisandro & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 533, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2003. "Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, May.
- Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999.
"Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 151-164, March.
- Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1998. "Markets and regulatory hold-up problems," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt9gf9t35g, University of California Transportation Center.
- Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999. "Markets and regulatory hold-up problems," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt76f9604n, University of California Transportation Center.
- Dawid, Herbert & Deissenberg, Christophe, 2005.
"On the efficiency-effects of private (dis-)trust in the government,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 530-550, August.
- Herbert Dawid & Christophe Deissenberg, "undated". "On the Efficiency-Effects of Private (Dis-)Trust in the Government," Modeling, Computing, and Mastering Complexity 2003 25, Society for Computational Economics.
- Biglaiser, Gary & Horowitz, John K & Quiggin, John, 1995. "Dynamic Pollution Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-44, July.
- McCallum, Bennett T., 1997.
"Crucial issues concerning central bank independence,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1996. "Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1996. "Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(3), pages 315-330, October.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
- Marsiliani, Laura & Renstrom, Thomas I, 2000. "Time Inconsistency in Environmental Policy: Tax Earmarking as a Commitment Solution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages 123-138, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Barolini, David, 2006. "Integrated versus Separated Regulation: An Application to the Water Industry," Economics Discussion Papers 8899, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Pedro, de Mendonça, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications," MPRA Paper 17889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsEnvironmental policy; Emissions taxes; Time inconsistency; Heterogeneous agents; Bounded rationality; Learning; Multiple equilibria; Stackelberg games;
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- C69 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Other
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.137. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.