IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

  • Amitrajeet Batabyal

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00339080
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 315-330

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:8:y:1996:i:3:p:315-330
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
  2. Willem H. Buiter, 1983. "Optimal and Time-Consistent Polices in Continuous Time Rational Expectations Models," NBER Technical Working Papers 0029, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1996. "Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control I: Competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 205-220, September.
  4. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1995. "Leading issues in domestic environmental regulation: A review essay," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 23-39, January.
  5. Karp, Larry, 1984. "Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 73-97, October.
  6. Karp, Larry & Newbery, David M G, 1989. "Intertemporal Consistency Issues in Depletable Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 346, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
  8. Willem H. Buiter, 1984. "Policy evaluation and design for continuous time linear rational expectations models: some recent development," NBER Technical Working Papers 0034, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:8:y:1996:i:3:p:315-330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.