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Simple taxation schemes on non–renewable resources extraction

  • Halkos, George
  • Papageorgiou, George

Traditional economic theory, up to the middle of the twentieth century, builds up the production functions regardless of the inputs’ scarcity. In the last few decades it has become clear that in many cases inputs are depletable quantities and at the same time a lot of constraints are imposed in their usage in order to ensure economic sustainability. Furthermore, the management of exploitation and use of natural resources (either exhaustible or renewable) has been discussed by analyzing dynamic models applying methods of Optimal Control Theory. This theory provides solutions that are concerned with a single decision maker who can control the model’s dynamics facing a certain performance index to be optimized. In this paper we consider some simple taxation schemes based both on price charged and on the stock size as well. As the feedback taxation rules are more efficient than the other (non feedback) rules we have constructed the simple taxation scheme and found the analytical expression of the tax function.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40945.

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Date of creation: Aug 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40945
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  1. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1996. "Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control I: Competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 205-220, September.
  2. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2006. "The Curse Of Windfall Gains In A Non Renewable Resource Oligopoly ," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 99-105, 06.
  3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521637329 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Karp Larry & Livernois John, 1994. "Using Automatic Tax Changes to Control Pollution Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 38-48, July.
  5. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 1997. "Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-21, CIRANO.
  6. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1995. "The design perspective in resource and environmental economics," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 317-325, December.
  7. Benchekroun, Hassan & Van Long, Ngo, 2002. "Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(274), pages 207-21, May.
  8. Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
  9. L. Lambertini, 2007. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand: A Differential Game Approach," Working Papers 598, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  10. Dockner, Engelbert & Feichtinger, Gustav & Mehlmann, Alexander, 1989. "Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-20, January.
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