Dynamic regulations in non –renewable resources oligopolistic markets
Traditional economic theory, up to the middle of the twentieth century, builds up the production functions regardless the inputs’ scarcity. In the last few decades has been clear that both the inputs are depletable quantities and a lot of constraints are imposed in their usage in order to ensure economic sustainability. Furthermore, the management of exploitation and use of natural resources (either exhaustible or renewable) has been discussed by analyzing dynamic models applying methods of Optimal Control Theory. This theory provides solutions that are concerned with a single decision maker who can control the model dynamics facing a certain performance index to be optimized. In fact, market structures or exploitation patterns are often oligopolistic, i.e. there are several decision makers whose policies influence each other. So, game theoretical approaches are introduced into the discussion. According to the theory of continuous time models of Optimal Control, the appropriate analogue of differential games is used. Roughly, this is the extension of Optimal Control, when there is exactly one decision maker, to the case of N(N≥ 2) decision makers interacting with each other.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Puu, Tonu, 1977. "On the profitability of exhausting natural resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 185-199, September.
- Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
- Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Yen, Jerome, 1995. "Dynamic Cournot oligopolies with production adjustment costs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 95-101.
- Dockner, Engelbert J. & Sorger, Gerhard, 1996. "Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a Dynamic Game on Productive Assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 209-227, October.
- Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1996.
"Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control I: Competition,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 205-220, September.
- Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1995. "Consistency and Optimality in a Dynamic Game of Pollution Control I: Competition," Working Papers 9529, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
- Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1995. "Consistency And Optimality In A Dynamic Game Of Pollution Control I: Competition," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers 28351, Utah State University, Economics Department.
- Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
- Dockner, Engelbert & Feichtinger, Gustav & Mehlmann, Alexander, 1989. "Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-20, January.
- L. Lambertini, 2007. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand: A Differential Game Approach," Working Papers 598, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & Van Long, Ngo, 2002. "Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(274), pages 207-21, May.
- Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24774. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.