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Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances

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  • Christos Koulovatianos

    (University of Luxembourg)

Abstract

Ecological instability caused by pollution, climate change, or by exogenous distortions in the food chain of biological organisms may increase the average natural death rate of certain species, or it may increase the variance of their natural death rate, or both. Here, rational noncooperative strategic harvesting in a predator–prey ecosystem that is subject to exogenous environmental disturbances is studied through an example that delivers analytical solutions. When players exploit only one of two interacting species, then in symmetric Markovian–Nash equilibrium: (i) the ‘tragedy of the commons’ holds and (ii) when exogenous factors increase and/or make more volatile the natural geometric death rate of the species under exploitation (of the non-harvested species) each player’s harvesting rate increases (decreases) and the commons problem is intensified (mitigated).

Suggested Citation

  • Christos Koulovatianos, 2024. "Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 57-77, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:14:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s13235-023-00527-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6
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    1. Hassan Benchekroun & Gerhard Sorger, 2024. "Preface: Special issue of Dynamic Games and Applications in Memory of Professor Ngo Van Long," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-6, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Resource exploitation; Food chain; Predator–prey ecosystem; Tragedy of the commons; Environmental distortions; Stochastic multidimensional differential games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q27 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Issues in International Trade
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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