Some Results on the Markov Equilibria of a Class of Homogeneous Differential Games
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- Van Long, Ngo & Shimomura, Koji, 1998. "Some results on the Markov equilibria of a class of homogeneous differential games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 557-566, January.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gerhard Sorger, 2005. "A dynamic common property resource problem with amenity value and extraction costs," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 3-19, March.
- Eggert, Wolfgang & Itaya, Jun-ichi & Mino, Kazuo, 2011.
"A dynamic model of conflict and appropriation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-182.
- Sébastien Rouillon, 2014.
"Do Social Status Seeking Behaviors Worsen the Tragedy of the Commons?,"
Dynamic Games and Applications,
Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 73-94, March.
- Sébastien Rouillon, 2014. "Do social status seeking behaviors worsen the tragedy of the commons?," Post-Print hal-01135584, HAL.
- List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
- Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura & Harutaka Takahashi, 1999.
"Comparing Open-loop With Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games,"
The Japanese Economic Review,
Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(4), pages 457-469, December.
- Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura & Harutaka Takahashi, 1997. "Comparing Open-Loop with Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-22, CIRANO.
- Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
- Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2007. "Development Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-23, CIRANO.
- Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2009. "Foreign Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(SI), pages 230-243, May.
More about this item
KeywordsDifferential games; Markov equilibrium; Jeux différentiels; Équilibres markoviens.;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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