Comparing Open-Loop with Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games
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- Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura & Harutaka Takahashi, 1999. "Comparing Open-loop With Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(4), pages 457-469, December.
References listed on IDEAS
- Clemhout, Simone & Wan, Henry Jr., 1994. "Differential games -- Economic applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 801-825, Elsevier.
- Takayama,Akira, 1985. "Mathematical Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521314985, December.
- Van Long, Ngo & Shimomura, Koji, 1998.
"Some results on the Markov equilibria of a class of homogeneous differential games,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 557-566, January.
- Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura, 1995. "Some Results on the Markov Equilibria of a Class of Homogeneous Differential Games," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-36, CIRANO.
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- Talat S. Genc & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "Investment Dynamics: Good News Principle," Working Papers 1006, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:269:y:2018:i:2:p:661-681 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:dyncon:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:142-164 is not listed on IDEAS
- Charles Figuières, 2009. "Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 39-68, January.
- Sébastien Rouillon, 2014.
"Do Social Status Seeking Behaviors Worsen the Tragedy of the Commons?,"
Dynamic Games and Applications,
Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 73-94, March.
- Sébastien Rouillon, 2014. "Do social status seeking behaviors worsen the tragedy of the commons?," Post-Print hal-01135584, HAL.
- Genc, Talat S. & De Giovanni, Pietro, 2018.
"Optimal return and rebate mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain game,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 269(2), pages 661-681.
- Talat S. Genc, 2017. "Optimal Return and Rebate Mechanism in a Closed-loop Supply Chain Game," Working Papers 1706, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
- Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2007. "Development Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-23, CIRANO.
- Genc, Talat S., 2017. "The impact of lead time on capital investments," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 142-164.
- repec:kap:theord:v:86:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-018-9671-y is not listed on IDEAS
- Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2009. "Foreign Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(SI), pages 230-243, May.
More about this item
KeywordsDifferential games; Markov perfect equilibria; open-loop equilibria; Jeux différentiels; équilibre Markov-parfait; équilibre en boucle ouverte;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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