Comparing Open-Loop with Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games
We consider a class of differential games with transition equations that are homogeneous of degree one. For any game G with a discount rate r, consider a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) with strategies that are linear in the state variables. We show that the time paths of the control variables of this equilibrium constitute an open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding game Classification-JEL: C72; C73; Q30
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- Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura, 1995. "Some Results on the Markov Equilibria of a Class of Homogeneous Differential Games," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-36, CIRANO.