Comparing Open-Loop with Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games
We consider a class of differential games with transition equations that are homogeneous of degree one. For any game G with a discount rate r, consider a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) with strategies that are linear in the state variables. We show that the time paths of the control variables of this equilibrium constitute an open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding game Classification-JEL: C72; C73; Q30
|Date of creation:||01 Apr 1997|
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- Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura, 1995.
"Some Results on the Markov Equilibria of a Class of Homogeneous Differential Games,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Van Long, Ngo & Shimomura, Koji, 1998. "Some results on the Markov equilibria of a class of homogeneous differential games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 557-566, January.
- Takayama,Akira, 1985. "Mathematical Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521314985.
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