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Comparing Open-loop With Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Ngo Van Long
  • Koji Shimomura
  • Harutaka Takahashi

Abstract

We consider a class of differential games with transition equations that are homogeneous of degree one. For any game G with a discount rate r, consider a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) with strategies that are linear in the state variables. We show that the time paths of the control variables of this equilibrium constitute an open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding game Classification-JEL: C72; C73; Q30

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1468-5876.00132
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Article provided by Japanese Economic Association in its journal Japanese Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 50 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 457-469

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:50:y:1999:i:4:p:457-469
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
  • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
  • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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  1. Takayama,Akira, 1985. "Mathematical Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521314985, December.
  2. Van Long, Ngo & Shimomura, Koji, 1998. "Some results on the Markov equilibria of a class of homogeneous differential games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 557-566, January.
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Cited by:

  1. Talat S. Genc & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "Investment Dynamics: Good News Principle," Working Papers 1006, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  2. Sébastien Rouillon, 2014. "Do Social Status Seeking Behaviors Worsen the Tragedy of the Commons?," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 73-94, March.
  3. Charles Figuières, 2009. "Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 39-68, January.
  4. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
  5. Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2007. "Development Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-23, CIRANO.

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