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On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

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Listed author(s):
  • GAUDET, Gérard
  • LOHOUES, Hervé

Abstract

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/544
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Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2005-15.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-15
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Web page: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca

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Keywords: common orty; natural resources; differential games; linear Markov strategies;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
  • D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
  • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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  1. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April.
  2. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
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Cited by:

  1. Agbo, Maxime, 2014. "Strategic exploitation with learning and heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 126-140.
  2. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Socio-economics of Fisheries and Aquaculture

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