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On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

  • GAUDET, Gérard
  • LOHOUES, Hervé

Nous déterminons des conditions nécessaires à l’existence d’équilibres de Nash markoviens parfaits en stratégies linéaires dans des jeux différentiels modélisant l’exploitation d’une ressource naturelle en propriété commune. Nous montrons que l’existence de tels équilibres est assujettie à l’existence d’une relation précise entre les éléments essentiels du modèle, notamment la fonction d’utilité des agents et la fonction de dynamique naturelle ou de reproduction de la ressource. Ainsi, pour une fonction d’utilité donnée, seule une famille spécifique de fonctions de reproduction est compatible avec l’utilisation de stratégies markoviennes linéaires. De même, lorsque la fonction de reproduction est connue, seule une famille particulière de fonctions d’utilité permet l’utilisation de stratégies linéaires.

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Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 19-2005.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:19-2005
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  1. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
  2. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521637329 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April.
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  1. Socio-economics of Fisheries and Aquaculture

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