Volatility forecasting for crude oil futures
This paper studies the forecasting properties of linear GARCH models for closing-day futures prices on crude oil, first position, traded in the New York Mercantile Exchange from January 1995 to November 2005. In order to account for fat tails in the empirical distribution of the series, we compare models based on the normal, Student’s t and Generalized Exponential distribution. We focus on out-of-sample predictability by ranking the models according to a large array of statistical loss functions. The results from the tests for predictive ability show that the GARCH-G model fares best for short horizons from one to three days ahead. For horizons from one week ahead, no superior model can be identified. We also consider out-ofsample loss functions based on Value-at-Risk that mimic portfolio managers and regulators’ preferences. EGARCH models display the best performance in this case.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna|
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
- Chaim Fershtman & Morton I. Kamien, 1987.
"Turnpike Properties in a Finite Horizon Differential Game: Dynamic Duopoly with Sticky Prices,"
746, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1990. "Turnpike Properties in a Finite-Horizon Differential Game: Dynamic Duopoly with Sticky Prices," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 49-60, February.
- Fershtman, C. & Kamien, M.I., 1988. "Turnpike Properties In A Finite Horizon Differential Game: Dynamic Duopoly With Sticky Prices," Papers 4-88, Tel Aviv.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-22, February.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-64, September.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop,Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions," Working Papers 393, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Caputo, Michael R., 2007. "The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 198-224, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:598. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.