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A Fuzzy Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game Analysis of Policies for Managing Water Allocation in a Reservoir System

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  • A. Ganji
  • D. Khalili
  • M. Karamouz
  • K. Ponnambalam
  • M. Javan

Abstract

In this paper a fuzzy dynamic Nash game model of interactions between water users in a reservoir system is presented. The model represents a fuzzy stochastic non-cooperative game in which water users are grouped into four players, where each player in game chooses its individual policies to maximize expected utility. The model is used to present empirical results about a real case water allocation from a reservoir, considering player (water user) non-cooperative behavior and also same level of information availability for individual players. According to the results an optimal allocation policy for each water user can be developed in addition to the optimal policy of the reservoir system. Also the proposed model is compared with two alternative dynamic models of reservoir optimization, namely Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) and Fuzzy-State Stochastic Dynamic programming (FSDP). The proposed modeling procedures can be applied as an appropriate tool for reservoir operation, considering the interaction among the water users as well as the water users and reservoir operator. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2008

Suggested Citation

  • A. Ganji & D. Khalili & M. Karamouz & K. Ponnambalam & M. Javan, 2008. "A Fuzzy Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game Analysis of Policies for Managing Water Allocation in a Reservoir System," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 22(1), pages 51-66, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:22:y:2008:i:1:p:51-66
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-006-9143-y
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    1. Mehran Homayounfar & Sai Lai & Mehdi Zommorodian & Amin Oroji & Arman Ganji & Sara Kaviani, 2015. "Developing a Non-Discrete Dynamic Game Model and Corresponding Monthly Collocation Solution Considering Variability in Reservoir Inflow," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 29(8), pages 2599-2618, June.
    2. Hadi Tarebari & Amir Hossein Javid & Seyyed Ahmad Mirbagheri & Hedayat Fahmi, 2018. "Multi-Objective Surface Water Resource Management Considering Conflict Resolution and Utility Function Optimization," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 32(14), pages 4487-4509, November.
    3. Mehran Homayounfar & Arman Ganji & C. Martinez, 2011. "A Novel Solution for Stochastic Dynamic Game of Water Allocation from a Reservoir Using Collocation Method," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 25(13), pages 3427-3444, October.
    4. Xiqin Wang & Yuan Zhang & Yong Zeng & Changming Liu, 2013. "Resolving Trans-jurisdictional Water Conflicts by the Nash Bargaining Method: A Case Study in Zhangweinan Canal Basin in North China," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 27(5), pages 1235-1247, March.
    5. Ben Li & Guangming Tan & Gang Chen, 2016. "Generalized Uncooperative Planar Game Theory Model for Water Distribution in Transboundary Rivers," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(1), pages 225-241, January.
    6. Mehdi Zomorodian & Sai Hin Lai & Mehran Homayounfar & Shaliza Ibrahim & Gareth Pender, 2017. "Development and application of coupled system dynamics and game theory: A dynamic water conflict resolution method," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(12), pages 1-24, December.
    7. Maryam Ghashghaie & Safar Marofi & Hossein Marofi, 2014. "Using System Dynamics Method to Determine the Effect of Water Demand Priorities on Downstream Flow," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(14), pages 5055-5072, November.
    8. Akbar Karimi & Reza Ardakanian, 2010. "Development of a Dynamic Long-Term Water Allocation Model for Agriculture and Industry Water Demands," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(9), pages 1717-1746, July.
    9. Li, W. & Li, Y.P. & Li, C.H. & Huang, G.H., 2010. "An inexact two-stage water management model for planning agricultural irrigation under uncertainty," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 97(11), pages 1905-1914, November.
    10. Shirin Moradi Far & Parisa-Sadat Ashofteh, 2024. "Optimization Operation of Water Resources Using Game Theory and Marine Predator Algorithm," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 38(2), pages 665-699, January.
    11. C. Sivapragasam & G. Vasudevan & J. Maran & C. Bose & S. Kaza & N. Ganesh, 2009. "Modeling Evaporation-Seepage Losses for Reservoir Water Balance in Semi-arid Regions," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 23(5), pages 853-867, March.
    12. A. Ganji & M. Shekarriz fard, 2010. "A Modified Constrained State Formulation of Stochastic Soil Moisture for Crop Water Allocation," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(3), pages 547-561, February.
    13. Ben Li & Guangming Tan & Gang Chen, 2016. "Generalized Uncooperative Planar Game Theory Model for Water Distribution in Transboundary Rivers," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(1), pages 225-241, January.

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