IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v8y2003i2p165-184.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information

Author

Listed:
  • Nils Hauenschild
  • Peter Stahlecker

Abstract

We consider a model of an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous firms and products where neither the cost nor the demand functions are common knowledge. Instead, each firm only has some vague ideas about the price strategies adopted by its competitors which is modelled by a fuzzy set. In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions. Furthermore, the impact of the fuzzy information on the equilibrium outcome is analyzed by means of a comparative static analysis within a particular model framework. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Nils Hauenschild & Peter Stahlecker, 2003. "Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(2), pages 165-184, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:165-184
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0099-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-003-0099-6
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10058-003-0099-6?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. A. Ganji & D. Khalili & M. Karamouz & K. Ponnambalam & M. Javan, 2008. "A Fuzzy Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game Analysis of Policies for Managing Water Allocation in a Reservoir System," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 22(1), pages 51-66, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:165-184. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.