Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information
We consider a model of an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous firms and products where neither the cost nor the demand functions are common knowledge. Instead, each firm only has some vague ideas about the price strategies adopted by its competitors which is modelled by a fuzzy set. In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions. Furthermore, the impact of the fuzzy information on the equilibrium outcome is analyzed by means of a comparative static analysis within a particular model framework. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003
Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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