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Resource extraction activity: an intergenerational approach with asymmetric players

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  • Luca Grilli

Abstract

In this paper we study a di®erential game, for resource extraction of a renewable good, in which players are overlapping generations of extractors. The framework of overlapping generations allows us to consider intragenerational (players in the same generation) and inter- generational (players in di®erent generations) game equilibrium. We consider the case in which old extractors face lower costs than young competitors and this will result in an advantage in strategies for old generation which compensate partially the reduced marginal resource rent. Since we consider overlapping generations, players have asyn- chronous horizons, in contrast with a number of studies in intertem- poral exploitation of resources in which players have identical time horizons. We obtain the values function and strategies for extractors both for young generation and for old generations.

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  • Luca Grilli, 2008. "Resource extraction activity: an intergenerational approach with asymmetric players," Quaderni DSEMS lg_gta_2008, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    • Handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:lg_gta_2008
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Grilli & Pasquale Marcello Falcone, 2010. "Quantitative Analysis of the Fishing Activity in the Gulf of Manfredonia (Gargano, South-Italy)," Quaderni DSEMS lg_jep_2010, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.

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