IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v33y1987i4p484-499.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game Analysis of Policies for Managing the Strategic Petroleum Reserves of Consuming Nations

Author

Listed:
  • Frederic H. Murphy

    (School of Business Administration, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122)

  • Michael A. Toman

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Howard J. Weiss

    (School of Business Administration, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122)

Abstract

In this paper we present a Nash dynamic game model of interactions among oil inventory and tariff policies for oil importing countries. The inventory policies consist of the rates for building up and drawing down strategic oil reserves, while the tariff policies consist of setting tariffs as a function of the state of the world oil market. The model represents a stochastic game in which countries are grouped into two players, where each player in the game chooses its individual policies to maximize expected social welfare. We use the model to present empirical results about the sizes of the stockpiles as a function of disruption probabilities, tariff policies and cooperation versus noncooperation between nations. In addition to results regarding the build-up and draw down rates as a function of the amount of disruption or probability of future disruption our central conclusion is that build-up and drawdown policies are essentially the same with or without international cooperation, due to the current inventory limits on U.S. and Foreign Strategic Petroleum Reserves.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederic H. Murphy & Michael A. Toman & Howard J. Weiss, 1987. "A Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game Analysis of Policies for Managing the Strategic Petroleum Reserves of Consuming Nations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 484-499, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:33:y:1987:i:4:p:484-499
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.33.4.484
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Abada, Ibrahim & Massol, Olivier, 2011. "Security of supply and retail competition in the European gas market.: Some model-based insights," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 4077-4088, July.
    2. Huanan Li & Xin Chen, 2016. "Dynamic game analysis on China’s public and private oil stockpiles," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 84(1), pages 715-723, October.
    3. Christophe Gouel, 2012. "Agricultural Price Instability: A Survey Of Competing Explanations And Remedies," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 129-156, February.
    4. Zhang, Xiao-Bing & Fan, Ying & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2009. "A model based on stochastic dynamic programming for determining China's optimal strategic petroleum reserve policy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4397-4406, November.
    5. Bai, Y. & Zhou, D.Q. & Zhou, P., 2012. "Modelling and analysis of oil import tariff and stockpile policies for coping with supply disruptions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 84-90.
    6. Bai, Y. & Zhou, D.Q. & Zhou, P. & Zhang, L.B., 2012. "Optimal path for China's strategic petroleum reserve: A dynamic programming analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1058-1063.
    7. Zhang, Xiao-Bing & Qin, Ping & Chen, Xiaolan, 2017. "Strategic oil stockpiling for energy security: The case of China and India," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 253-260.
    8. Xie, Nan & Yan, Zhijun & Zhou, Yi & Huang, Wenjun, 2017. "China's optimal stockpiling policies in the context of new oil price trend," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 332-340.
    9. Fan, Ying & Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2010. "Modelling the strategic petroleum reserves of China and India by a stochastic dynamic game," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 505-519, July.
    10. Wu, Gang & Fan, Ying & Liu, Lan-Cui & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2008. "An empirical analysis of the dynamic programming model of stockpile acquisition strategies for China's strategic petroleum reserve," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1470-1478, April.
    11. repec:eee:enepol:v:117:y:2018:i:c:p:25-38 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. repec:eee:eneeco:v:72:y:2018:i:c:p:255-262 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Chen, Xin & Mu, Hailin & Li, Huanan & Gui, Shusen, 2014. "Using stockpile delegation to improve China׳s strategic oil policy: A multi-dimension stochastic dynamic programming approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 28-42.
    14. Mehran Homayounfar & Arman Ganji & C. Martinez, 2011. "A Novel Solution for Stochastic Dynamic Game of Water Allocation from a Reservoir Using Collocation Method," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 25(13), pages 3427-3444, October.
    15. Wu, Gang & Wei, Yi-Ming & Nielsen, Chris & Lu, Xi & McElroy, Michael B., 2012. "A dynamic programming model of China's strategic petroleum reserve: General strategy and the effect of emergencies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1234-1243.
    16. Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2014. "Optimal strategic oil stockpiling and import tariffs: The case of China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 463-474.
    17. A. Ganji & D. Khalili & M. Karamouz & K. Ponnambalam & M. Javan, 2008. "A Fuzzy Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game Analysis of Policies for Managing Water Allocation in a Reservoir System," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 22(1), pages 51-66, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    energy; games; dynamic programming;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:33:y:1987:i:4:p:484-499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.