Security of supply in the European Gas Market A model-based analysis
This paper introduces a general static Cournot-game model to study the Natural Gas market, taking into account disruption risks from suppliers. In order to most realistically describe the economical situation, our representation divides the market into two stages: the upstream market that links -by means of long-term contracts- local producers in exporting countries (Russia, Algeria, etc.) to foreign retailers who bring gas to the consuming countries to satisfy local demands in the downstream market. Thanks to short-run demand functions, we are able to introduce disruption costs to be paid to the consumers should disruption occur. First we mathematically develop our general model and write the associated KKT conditions, then we propose some case studies -under iso-elasticity assumptions- for the long-short-run inverse-demand curves in order to predict qualitatively and quantitatively the impacts of supply disruptions on Western European gas trade. In the second part, we study in detail the German gas market of the 80 to explain the supply choices of Germany, and we derive interesting conclusions and insights concerning the amounts and prices of Natural Gas brought to the market. The last part of the paper is dedicated to a study of the Bulgarian gas market, which is greatly dependent on the Russian gas supplies and hence very sensitive to interruption risks. Some thought-provoking conclusions are derived concerning the necessity to economically regulate the market, by means of gas amounts control, if the disruption probability is high enough.
|Date of creation:||2010|
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- Anne Neumann & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2006.
"Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited – An Empirical Analysis of producer-Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry,"
0610, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- Christian Hirschhausen & Anne Neumann, 2008. "Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of Producer–Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 131-143, March.
- Neumann, A. & von Hirschhausen, C., 2006. "Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited -An Empirical Analysis of Producer-Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0630, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Anne Neumann & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2006. "Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of Producer-Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 552, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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