IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v41y2012icp466-473.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A review of the role and remit of the committee on climate change

Author

Listed:
  • McGregor, Peter G.
  • Kim Swales, J.
  • Winning, Matthew A.

Abstract

Domestic action on climate change requires a combination of solutions, in terms of institutions and policy instruments. One way of achieving government carbon policy goals may be the creation of an independent body to advise on, or set, monitor policy. This paper critically assesses the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which was created in 2008 as an independent body to help move the UK towards a low-carbon economy. We look at the motivation for its creation. In particular we consider its ability to overcome a time-inconsistency problem by comparing it to another independent body, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. In practice the CCC appears to be the “inverse” of the Monetary Policy Committee, in that it advises on what the policy goal should be rather than being held responsible for achieving it. The CCC incorporates both advisory and monitoring functions to inform government and achieve a credible carbon policy over a long time frame. This is a similar framework to that adopted by Stern (2006), but the CCC operates on a continuing basis and also incorporates a unique climate change monitoring function.

Suggested Citation

  • McGregor, Peter G. & Kim Swales, J. & Winning, Matthew A., 2012. "A review of the role and remit of the committee on climate change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 466-473.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:41:y:2012:i:c:p:466-473
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.11.007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511008846
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.11.007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    3. Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn & Richard Mash, 2003. "Credible Carbon Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(3), pages 438-450.
    4. Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn & Richard Mash, 2003. "Time Inconsistent Environmental Policy and Optimal Delegation," Economics Series Working Papers 175, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    5. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    6. Stern,Nicholas, 2007. "The Economics of Climate Change," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521700801, October.
    7. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, 2002. "Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 617-635, October.
    8. Pearce, David W, 1991. "The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 938-948, July.
    9. Thierry Vignolo & Jacques Percebois & Agnes dArtigues, 2007. "The time-inconsistency of alternative energy policy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 1(1), pages 1-7.
    10. Jacques Percebois & Agnès d' Artigues & Thierry Vignolo, 2007. "The time-inconsistency of alternative energy policy," Post-Print hal-02872687, HAL.
    11. Jacques Percebois, 2007. "The European Energy Policy," Post-Print hal-03066952, HAL.
    12. Newell, Richard G. & Pizer, William A., 2003. "Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 416-432, March.
    13. William D. Nordhaus, 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 686-702, September.
    14. Alex Bowen & James Rydge, 2011. "Climate-Change Policy in the United Kingdom," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 886, OECD Publishing.
    15. Martin L. Weitzman, 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 703-724, September.
    16. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    17. Agnes d'Artigues & Jacques Percebois & Thierry Vignolo, 2007. "The Time-Inconsistency of Alternative Energy Policy," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/32, European University Institute.
    18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:1:y:2007:i:1:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    20. Marsiliani, Laura & Renstrom, Thomas I, 2000. "Time Inconsistency in Environmental Policy: Tax Earmarking as a Commitment Solution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages 123-138, March.
    21. Munksgaard, Jesper & Pedersen, Klaus Alsted, 2001. "CO2 accounts for open economies: producer or consumer responsibility?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 327-334, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Karoline S. Rogge & Elisabeth Dütschke, 2017. "Exploring Perceptions of the Credibility of Policy Mixes: The Case of German Manufacturers of Renewable Power Generation Technologies," SPRU Working Paper Series 2017-23, SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School.
    2. Allan, Grant & Eromenko, Igor & Gilmartin, Michelle & Kockar, Ivana & McGregor, Peter, 2015. "The economics of distributed energy generation: A literature review," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 543-556.
    3. Magnus C. Abraham-Dukuma & Michael O. Dioha & Natalia Bogado & Hemen Mark Butu & Francis N. Okpaleke & Qaraman M. Hasan & Shari Babajide Epe & Nnaemeka Vincent Emodi, 2020. "Multidisciplinary Composition of Climate Change Commissions: Transnational Trends and Expert Perspectives," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-23, December.
    4. Patrizio Lecca & Grant Allan & Peter McGregor & Kim Swales, 2013. "The Impact of the Introduction of a Carbon Tax for Scotland," ERSA conference papers ersa13p501, European Regional Science Association.
    5. Allan, Grant & Lecca, Patrizio & McGregor, Peter & Swales, Kim, 2014. "The economic and environmental impact of a carbon tax for Scotland: A computable general equilibrium analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 40-50.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Florian Habermacher & Paul Lehmann, 2020. "Commitment Versus Discretion in Climate and Energy Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(1), pages 39-67, May.
    2. Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn & Richard Mash, 2003. "Time Inconsistent Environmental Policy and Optimal Delegation," Economics Series Working Papers 175, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Florian Habermacher & Paul Lehmann, 2017. "Commitment vs. Discretion in Climate and Energy Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 6355, CESifo.
    4. Chiappinelli, Olga & May, Nils, 2022. "Too good to be true? Time-inconsistent renewable energy policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    5. Joseph E. Aldy & Alan J. Krupnick & Richard G. Newell & Ian W. H. Parry & William A. Pizer, 2010. "Designing Climate Mitigation Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 903-934, December.
    6. Garth Heutel, 2012. "How Should Environmental Policy Respond to Business Cycles? Optimal Policy under Persistent Productivity Shocks," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(2), pages 244-264, April.
    7. Garth Heutel, 2012. "How Should Environmental Policy Respond to Business Cycles? Optimal Policy under Persistent Productivity Shocks," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(2), pages 244-264, April.
    8. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
    9. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    10. Philippe Aghion & Antoine Dechezleprêtre & David Hémous & Ralf Martin & John Van Reenen, 2016. "Carbon Taxes, Path Dependency, and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from the Auto Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 1-51.
    11. Mats Persson & Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example," International Economic Association Series, in: Guillermo Calvo & Mervyn King (ed.), The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy, chapter 2, pages 28-66, Palgrave Macmillan.
    12. Lars P Feld & Volker Wieland, 2021. "The German Federal Constitutional Court Ruling and the European Central Bank’s Strategy," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 217-253.
    13. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Leonardo Bursztyn & David Hemous, 2012. "The Environment and Directed Technical Change," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 131-166, February.
    14. Jamus Jerome Lim, 2021. "The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 309-335, March.
    15. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
    16. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2011. "The Optimality And Controllability Of Monetary Policy Through Delegation With Consistent Targets," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(1), pages 82-106, February.
    17. Pindyck, Robert S., 2012. "Uncertain outcomes and climate change policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 289-303.
    18. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan & Stehlík, Petr, 2009. "Rogoff revisited: The conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 140-143, September.
    19. Westerhout, Ed, 2021. "Inflation-Linked Bonds, Nominal Bonds, and Countercyclical Monetary Policies," Discussion Paper 2021-001, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    20. Traeger, Christian, 2021. "ACE - Analytic Climate Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 15968, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:41:y:2012:i:c:p:466-473. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.