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Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility

Author

Listed:
  • Mukerji Sujoy

    (Oxford University)

  • Shin Hyun Song

    (London School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper concerns the interpretation of equilibrium in non-additive beliefs in two-player normal form games. We argue that such equilibria involve beliefs and actions which are consistent with a lack of common knowledge of the game. Our argument rests on representation results which show that different notions of equilibrium in games with non-additive beliefs may be reinterpreted as equilibrium in associated games of incomplete information with additive (Bayesian) beliefs where common knowledge of the (original) game does not apply. The representation results show one way of comparing and understanding the various notions of equilibrium, for games with non-additive beliefs, advanced in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Mukerji Sujoy & Shin Hyun Song, 2002. "Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-30, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1011
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    Cited by:

    1. Roman Kozhan, 2011. "Non-additive anonymous games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 215-230, May.
    2. Gilboa, Itzhak & Samuelson, Larry & Schmeidler, David, 2022. "Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    3. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
    4. Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2005. "Incomplete Information Games With Multiple Priors," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 332-351, September.
    5. Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon & EUREQua & CNRS - Universite Paris I., 2003. "An overview of economic applications of David Schmeidler`s models of decision making under uncertainty," Economics Series Working Papers 165, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    6. Kota Saito, 2010. "Preference for Randomization - Ambiguity Aversion and Inequality Aversion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000094, David K. Levine.
    7. Kaito Sato, 2011. "Preference for Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion," Discussion Papers 1524, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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