Jocul ciclic – Statele Unite ale Americii versus Coreea de Nord din unghiul teoriei mutărilor strategice
It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as one side (North Korea) overleverages its position, while the other side makes unproductive compromises.
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Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 04 (December)
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