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The punctuality stability of the Nash equilibrium: the advantage of a late player in potential and aggregative games

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  • Vasily V. Gusev

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

If all players in a game employ Nash-equilibrium strategies, then no single player benefits from changing their strategy alone. In real games however, some players may intentionally arrive late and get a payoff greater than at the equilibrium. To wit, it sometimes pays to wait for competitors to announce their prices and then set the price for one’s own product. The motivation for intentional tardiness is the advantage of making the last move. Can it be arranged so that no player arrives in the game late intentionally? Responding to this challenge, we suggest forming a punctually stable Nash-equilibrium strategy profile. In this study, we investigate whether such a strategy profile exists in potential, aggregative, and symmetric games. What is remarkable about this study is that in some game-theoretical settings all-player punctuality can be achieved without penalizing late arrivals.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasily V. Gusev, 2023. "The punctuality stability of the Nash equilibrium: the advantage of a late player in potential and aggregative games," HSE Working papers WP BRP 261/EC/2023, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:261/ec/2023
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    File URL: https://wp.hse.ru/data/2023/04/12/2027804959/261EC2023.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; punctuality stability; potential games; aggregative games; symmetric games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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