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A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world

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Listed:
  • Lahiri, Somdeb

Abstract

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Lahiri, Somdeb, 2009. "A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world," MPRA Paper 14129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14129
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14174/1/MPRA_paper_14174.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    2. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-879, May.
    3. Ferejohn, John A. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1979. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 28-45, August.
    4. Kemp, Murray C & Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1976. "On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(169), pages 59-66, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    acyclic; index; single-profile; social welfare relation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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