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The New Basel Accord and the Nature of Risk: A Game Theoretic Perspective


  • Siebe, Wilfried
  • Milde, Hellmuth
  • Broll, Udo
  • Bieta, Volker


Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a non-strategic model setting (measuring event risk stochastically) to a more general strategic model setting (measuring behavioral risk adequately) comes true. Knowing that a game is any situation in which the players make strategic decisions – i.e., decisions that take into account each other's actions and responses – game theory is a useful set of tools for better understanding different risk settings. Embedded in a short history of the Basel Accord in this article we introduce some basic ideas of game theory in the context of rating procedures in accordance with Basel II. As well, some insight is given how game theory works. Here, the primary value of game theory stems from its focus on behavioral risk: risk when all agents are presumed rational, each attempting to anticipate likely actions and reactions by its rivals

Suggested Citation

  • Siebe, Wilfried & Milde, Hellmuth & Broll, Udo & Bieta, Volker, 2007. "The New Basel Accord and the Nature of Risk: A Game Theoretic Perspective," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 07/07, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0707

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2003. "Economics and the Theory of Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775908, March.
    2. Franck Jovanovic & Philippe Le Gall, 2001. "Does God practice a random walk? The 'financial physics' of a nineteenth-century forerunner, Jules Regnault," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 332-362.
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    More about this item


    New Basel Accord; event risk; behavioral risk; rating; simple game; Nash-equilibrium; game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other


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