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The economics behind the awarding of terminals in seaports: Towards a research agenda

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  • Theys, Christophe
  • Notteboom, Theo E.
  • Pallis, Athanasios A.
  • De Langen, Peter W.

Abstract

Terminal concessions in seaports have only recently gained interest in academic circles. Issues such as the allocation mechanisms (to be) used for granting those concessions, the determination of the concession term and concession fees, as well as the inclusion of special clauses aimed at assuring that the terminal operator will act in the interest of the port authority and the wider community, are increasingly relevant to both academics and the port industry. So far, insights from established economic theories have rarely been applied to terminal concessions in seaports. It, therefore, remains to be seen which kind of awarding procedure would be best for which type of terminal concession. This contribution provides a detailed overview of the different phases of the terminal awarding process, including a classification scheme for awarding procedures, and contains an extensive discussion on the economic issues that require further investigation. The paper concludes by proposing a comprehensive research agenda on the topic.

Suggested Citation

  • Theys, Christophe & Notteboom, Theo E. & Pallis, Athanasios A. & De Langen, Peter W., 2010. "The economics behind the awarding of terminals in seaports: Towards a research agenda," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 37-50.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:27:y:2010:i:1:p:37-50
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    Cited by:

    1. Yip, Tsz Leung & Liu, John Jianhua & Fu, Xiaowen & Feng, Jiejian, 2014. "Modeling the effects of competition on seaport terminal awarding," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 341-349.
    2. Kaselimi, Evangelia N. & Notteboom, Theo E. & Pallis, Athanasios A. & Farrell, Sheila, 2011. "Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) and preferred scale of container terminals," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-80.
    3. Zhang, Jihua, 2016. "Quasi-landlord port financing in China: Features, practice and a contract theory analysis," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 73-88.
    4. Cabrera, María & Suárez-Alemán, Ancor & Trujillo, Lourdes, 2015. "Public-private partnerships in Spanish Ports: Current status and future prospects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-11.
    5. Pallis, Athanasios A. & de Langen, Peter W., 2010. "Seaports and the structural implications of the economic crisis," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 10-18.
    6. Ferrari, Claudio & Parola, Francesco & Tei, Alessio, 2015. "Governance models and port concessions in Europe: Commonalities, critical issues and policy perspectives," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 60-67.
    7. Seo, Young-Joon & Park, Jin Suk, 2016. "The estimation of minimum efficient scale of the port industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 168-175.
    8. Wang, Grace W.Y. & Pallis, Athanasios A., 2014. "Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port concession agreements," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 162-174.

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    Concessions Seaports Governance;

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