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Infinite Idealizations and Approximate Explanations in Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Max Albert

    (University of Giessen)

  • Hartmut Kliemt

    (University of Giessen)

Abstract

If we take it that, at least in the social sciences, “realistic” implies “finite”, then countless economic models involving infinitary assumptions must obviously be classified as unrealistic—for example, models with infinitely divisible goods, a continuum of traders, consumers optimizing over an infinite time horizon, or players optimizing over an infinite number of interactions. We argue that unrealistic models involving infinities can, in principle, supply explanations in economics. We develop a concept of approximate explanation based on the “method of decreasing abstraction”, that is, the practice of approximating complex situations through a sequence of increasingly realistic models. Our account of approximate explanation renders the testing view of economic science compatible with scientific realism. However, compatibility does not extend to the folk theorems for infinitely repeated games, which are used widely in applied economics (e.g., in industrial economics) and beyond (e.g., spontaneous emergence of social order). Explanations based on these theorems are rejected by our criterion.

Suggested Citation

  • Max Albert & Hartmut Kliemt, 2017. "Infinite Idealizations and Approximate Explanations in Economics," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201726, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201726
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Max Albert, 2022. "How to Escape from Model Platonism in Economics: Critical Assumptions, Robust Conclusions, and Approximate Explanations," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 37-68, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Approximate explanation; Folk theorems of game theory; Infinite idealizations; Method of decreasing abstraction; Methodology of economics; Unrealistic assumptions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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