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Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation

  • César Andrés Mantilla

    ()

This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner´s Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.

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File URL: http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/dcede2012-04.pdf
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Paper provided by UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE in its series DOCUMENTOS CEDE with number 009386.

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Length: 40
Date of creation: 29 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:col:000089:009386
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  1. Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics," Papers 08-15-2005a, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  2. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall.
  3. Jimena Hurtado, 2011. "Tocqueville on Poverty in Industrial Democracies," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 007961, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  4. Ahn, T K, et al, 2001. " Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 137-55, January.
  5. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
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