Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2006.
"Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics,"
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More about this item
KeywordsPrisoner's Dilemma - Payoff Inequality - Evolutionary Game Theory;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-EVO-2012-04-03 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-04-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-04-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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