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Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation

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  • César Andrés Mantilla

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Abstract

This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner´s Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • César Andrés Mantilla, 2012. "Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 009386, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:009386
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    File URL: http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/dcede2012-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    2. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 699-746.
    3. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2003. "Economics and the Theory of Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521772518.
    4. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall.
    5. Jimena Hurtado, 2011. "Tocqueville on Poverty in Industrial Democracies," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 007961, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    6. Ahn, T K & Ostrom, Elinor & Shupp, Robert & Walker, James, 2001. "Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 137-155, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner's Dilemma - Payoff Inequality - Evolutionary Game Theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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