IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v145y2016icp255-257.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A new characterization of the proportional rule for claims problems

Author

Listed:
  • Thomson, William

Abstract

For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, we develop a new proof of an important result due to Young (1995), a characterization of the proportional rule, rather, we prove a dual characterization of this rule. Our axioms are composition down, which states the equivalence of two ways of dealing with possible decreases in the amount to divide, and self-duality, according to which, for each problem, a rule divides what is available symmetrically to the way it divides what is missing, that is, the difference between the sum of the claims and the endowment, in the dual problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomson, William, 2016. "A new characterization of the proportional rule for claims problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 255-257.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:255-257
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651630249X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    2. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    3. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
    4. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2021. "An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 2799-2812, May.
    2. Csóka, Péter, 2017. "Az arányos csődszabály karakterizációja körbetartozások esetén [The characterization of the proportional rule in the case of circular liabilities]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 930-942.
    3. Karol Flores-Szwagrzak & Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2020. "Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 559-579, April.
    4. Dietzenbacher, Bas, 2018. "Egalitarian allocation principles," Other publications TiSEM 01be3135-efa6-4f51-b2ef-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jingyi Xue, 2018. "Fair division with uncertain needs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 105-136, June.
    2. Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2023. "Additive adjudication of conflicting claims," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 93-116, March.
    3. Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2021. "On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 1133-1159, October.
    4. Stovall, John E., 2014. "Collective rationality and monotone path division rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 1-24.
    5. Wulf Gaertner & Lars Schwettmann, 2017. "Burden sharing in deficit countries: a questionnaire-experimental investigation," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 113-144, June.
    6. B. Dietzenbacher & A. Estévez-Fernández & P. Borm & R. Hendrickx, 2021. "Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 65-80, June.
    7. Qianqian Kong & Hans Peters, 2023. "Sequential claim games," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 45(3), pages 955-975, September.
    8. Victor Ginsburgh & Juan D. Moreno‐Ternero, 2018. "Compensation schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(7), pages 1775-1789, July.
    9. Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2017. "Duality in land rental problems," MPRA Paper 80509, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Victor Ginsburgh & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2018. "On Poverty and the International Allocation of Development Aid," Working Papers ECARES 2018-23, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    11. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jose María Chamorro & Leticia Lorenzo & Silvia Lorenzo‐Freire, 2018. "Mixed rules in multi‐issue allocation situations," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 66-77, February.
    12. Long, Yan & Sethuraman, Jay & Xue, Jingyi, 2021. "Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    13. Ketelaars, Martijn & Borm, Peter, 2021. "On the Unification of Centralized and Decentralized Clearing Mechanisms in Financial Networks," Discussion Paper 2021-015, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Koster, Maurice & Boonen, Tim J., 2019. "Constrained stochastic cost allocation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 20-30.
    15. Sinan Ertemel & Rajnish Kumar, 2018. "Proportional rules for state contingent claims," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 229-246, March.
    16. Andrea Gallice, 2019. "Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 311-336, March.
    17. Karol Flores-Szwagrzak & Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2020. "Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 559-579, April.
    18. Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol, 2015. "Priority classes and weighted constrained equal awards rules for the claims problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 36-55.
    19. Gaertner, Wulf & Xu, Yongsheng, 2020. "Loss sharing: Characterizing a new class of rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 37-40.
    20. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & António Osório & Josep E. Peris, 2015. "From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(1), pages 1-7, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Claims problems; Proportional rule; Composition down; Self-duality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:255-257. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.