Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments
In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to manipulate market equilibrium by destroying and withholding ones initial endowments.
|Date of creation:||08 Aug 2008|
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- Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2007.
"Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 598.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
- Campbell,Donald E., 1987. "Resource Allocation Mechanisms," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521319904, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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