Cheating for the common good in a Macroeconomic policy game
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- Deissenberg, Christophe & Gonzalez, Francisco Alvarez, 2002. "Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(9-10), pages 1457-1479, August.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, January.
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- Arifovic, Jasmina & Dawid, Herbert & Deissenberg, Christophe & Kostyshyna, Olena, 2010.
"Learning benevolent leadership in a heterogenous agents economy,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 1768-1790, September.
- Jasmina Arifovic & Herbert Dawid & Christophe Deissenberg & Olena Kostyshyna, 2008. "Learning Benevolent Leadership in a Heterogenous Agents Economy," Working Papers halshs-00339761, HAL.
- repec:kap:jbuset:v:145:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10551-016-3118-6 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsMacroeconomic policy-making; Kydland-Prescott model; time inconsistency; reinforcement learning; reversed Stackelberg games; optimal cheating strategies; reputation; credibility.;
- C69 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Other
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
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